for their valuable comments. The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not re ect the views of the Federal Reserve Board sta or the Board of Governors.
Introduction
The ten years from 1983 to 1992 were by far the United States banking industry's worst since the Great Depression. During that time 1,501 federally insured commercial banks holding $236 billion in real deposits failed. To put these numbers in perspective, only 230 banks holding $45 billion in real deposits failed during the 35 years prior to 1983. 1 Though no single phenomenon can fully explain this dramatic surge in bank insolvency, as the quotation above shows, commentators within the industry have cited increased competition among banks and between banks and other lending institutions as an important contributing factor. In this view, vigorous competition during the 1980s encouraged banks to loosen underwriting standards and monitor borrowing rms less diligently, enabling borrowers to take on greater risk and making banks more vulnerable to the e ects of economic downturns.
This perspective on the U.S. banking crisis not only suggests a relationship between market power and bank risk, it may also imply a relationship between market power and loan interest rates that con icts with standard microeconomic intuition. Increased competition may necessitate higher interest rates to compensate banks for greater borrower risk. This paper examines the interaction between bank market power, loan interest rates, and bank risk in a model of lending characterized by o verlapping moral hazard problems between borrowers and banks, and between banks and a g o vernment guarantor of bank deposits.
A moral hazard problem between banks and borrowers arises from the contract form of a bank loan under which the interest rate paid by a borrower is xed when the loan is made. Given such a debt contract, a borrower may increase the riskiness of its investments to obtain higher returns net of interest expenses that more than compensate for a greater likelihood of failure. To mitigate this moral hazard problem, banks monitor and impose collateral requirements on borrowers.
Similarly, banks have an incentive to make risky loans in exchange for high returns because they raise the majority of their funds through debt contracts with depositors. By allowing banks to become highly leveraged, deposit insurance exacerbates this moral hazard problem. To prevent excessive risk-taking by banks, regulators impose restrictions on bank activities, require banks to issue equity capital, and continually supervise banks.
In our analysis of market power and interest rates, we show that the canonical positive relationship breaks down when bank moral hazard with respect to the government guarantor of deposits is weak, but rm moral hazard with respect to banks is strong. In a competitive lending environment, strong incentives for rms to take on risk determine the equilibrium; rms invest in high-risk projects, banks are compensated for the higher likelihood of loan defaults with relatively high interest rates, and banks do not attempt to prevent unsafe investments through monitoring. In contrast, in a monopolistic lending environment, the bank's weak moral hazard leads to a more conservative equilibrium characterized by a l o wer interest rate, less risk-taking behavior by rms, and greater monitoring by the bank. For all other con gurations of the overlapping moral hazard problem, the market power interest rate relationship is positive.
These results indicate that the direction of the empirical relationship between market power and interest rates may depend on business cycle conditions and the industry focus of bank lending. Firm moral hazard is likely to be greatest during economic recessions when the return on safe investment projects may be particularly low. Assuming that regulatory oversight minimizes bank moral hazard, measures of market power should tend to bepositively correlated with loan interest rates during times of economic expansion and negatively correlated with interest rates during recessionary periods. Similarly, some borrowers, such as small businesses with limited access to safe investments, may always have a high degree of moral hazard. Therefore, we might expect to observe a negative relationship between interest rates and concentration among banks specializing in lending to these borrowers.
Although no empirical research examines the interest rate market power relationship over the business cycle, several studies investigate this relationship in crosssectional settings. In a study of lending to small businesses, Petersen and Rajan 1995 nd that the market power interest rate relationship is negative for young rms and positive for older rms. They argue that these results are consistent with a dynamic model of lending relationships. Our model suggests an alternative explanation that follows almost immediately from Diamond's 1991 observation that young rms are likely to have strong moral hazard because they have limited reputations. Given Diamond's assertion, if banks have weak moral hazard, the market for loans to young rms is precisely the type of market in which our model predicts a negative market power interest relationship. Our model predicts the usual positive market power interest rate relationship for older rms, since they have reputations that weaken their moral hazard.
Studies by Berger and Hannan 1989 , and Hannan 1991 , 1997 analyze the interest rate market power relationship using bank balance sheet data. Operating under the assumption that high interest rates re ect market power, these studies interpret positive correlations between interest rates and concentration measures such as the Her ndahl Index as evidence that concentration generates market power. Our results indicate that because market power may actually lead to lower interest rates, such tests may not fully capture the role of market concentration in determining market power.
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In our analysis of market power and bank risk, we nd that the strength of the bank's moral hazard with respect to the government guarantor determines the direction of the relationship. This result follows intuitively from the notion that market power enables banks to better control the behavior of borrowers through control over interest rates. A negative relationship between market power and bank risk arises for relatively conservative banks because these banks prefer low risk equilibria and are able to choose interest rates to ensure that such equilibria arise. Similarly, we nd a w eakly positive market power bank risk relationship for banks with relatively high moral hazard that prefer high-risk equilibria.
Two other papers directly examine the relationship between market power and bank risk. Keeley 1990 abstracts from bank monitoring and rm investment decisions, and focuses on the e ect of charter value on bank risk. Because market power creates charter value and charter value reduces banks' incentives to take risks, he nds a negative market power bank risk relationship. Caminal and Matutes 1997 include bank monitoring and rm investment decisions in their model, however, in equilibrium these actions only indirectly in uence bank risk through their e ects on equilibrium loan sizes. Carminal and Matutes nd that banks with market power control rm moral hazard through monitoring whereas competitive banks control moral hazard by making smaller loans. Because larger loans are more sensitive to aggregate shocks than smaller loans, they nd a positive market power bank risk relationship. We model bank lending as a two-stage, imperfect information game between a bank and a rm. Section 2 describes this model. Section 3 examines the equilibrium bank monitoring and rm investment strategies given a loan interest rate. Section 4 solves for equilibrium interest rates under two simple lending market structures: monopoly and perfect competition. The relationship between market structure, moral hazard, and bank risk is examined in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a reexamination of the 1980s banking crisis in light of our model. Proofs of all lemmas are provided in the appendix.
2 The Model 2.1 Players A pro t maximizing rm has access to two di erent i n vestment projects, a safe project and an unsafe project. Each project requires $1 of investment capital. Denote the rm's probabilities of choosing the safe and the unsafe project by p s and 1 , p s respectively. The unsafe project pays u in the future with probability , and 0 with probability 1 , . The safe project pays s with certainty.
The relationship between the distribution of project returns and the risk-free interest rate r f is governed by the following assumption. Assumption 1 0 s , r f u , r f .
The lower bound imposed on s , r f ensures that investment in the safe technology is socially desirable.
3
The upper bound states that in the absence of monitoring by the bank, the rm always has an incentive to take on risk.
A pro t maximizing bank holds capital k and collects deposits 1 , k in order to lend $1 of investment funds to the rm at the interest rate r. The level of k is xed and is set by an outside regulator before the game begins. Deposits are insured, so that if the bank fails an outside insurance fund the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or FDIC repays depositors. The price of deposit insurance is xed. Without loss of generality, w e assume the price of deposit insurance is zero.
To abstract from issues related to portfolio diversi cation, we assume that the bank can make only one loan to a single rm. This assumption is common in the theoretical literature on moral hazard problems in bank lending. See, for example, Boyd, Chang and Smith 1998. It is equivalent to assuming that a bank lends to several rms but that the returns on the risky investment projects available to those rms are highly correlated. Such a situation is most likely to arise when a bank specializes in lending to a narrow industry or geographic market.
The bank may monitor the investment activities of the rm with some probability p m . Monitoring allows the bank to recall the loan principle if the rm invests in an unsafe project. 4 The present discounted cost of monitoring is m. We place the following restriction on m, k, and the distribution of payo s:
Assumption 2 m 1 , kr f u .
3 Assumption 1 could be easily modi ed to incorporate exogenous rm collateral or reputation. However since we allow exibility i n t h e extent of the rm's moral hazard, such extensions would needlessly complicate the exposition. 4 Relaxing the assumption that monitoring allows full recovery of the loan when an unsafe project is detected in no way c hanges the nature of our results.
This assumption is a necessary condition for monitoring to occur with positive probability o ver some range of interest rates. It states that the expected loss in capital to a bank that lends to a rm undertaking an unsafe investment is larger than the cost of monitoring a loan, however, the bank's capital requirement is not so high that it never has an incentive to take advantage of deposit insurance.
Timing
The game between the bank and the rm has two stages. The rst stage, shown in Figure 1 , models the product market structure. We consider two simple structures. In the rst panel a, banks are assumed to have monopoly power over loan customers. The bank chooses an interest rate to o er the rm and the rm then decides whether to accept or reject the loan. If the loan is rejected the rm is liquidated.
In the second structure panel b, banks are assumed to compete for loan customers in a perfectly competitive lending market. In a competitive equilibrium there should be no incentive for banks to enter or exit, which implies that the rm's pro ts attain a maximum given the constraint that the bank earns zero economic rents. We model a competitive lending environment directly by assuming that the rm o ers the bank an interest rate. The bank must either accept or reject the o er, and has no opportunity t o renegotiate the terms of the loan. If the bank rejects the rm's o er, it must invest it's capital and deposits in the risk-free bond.
If the bank and the rm agree to write a debt contract in stage one, play proceeds to stage two, shown in Figure 2 . This subgame models the bank's monitoring decision and the rm's investment decision. Following Besanko and Kanatas 1993, we assume the bank cannot commit to monitor the rm. is not observed by the rm before it makes its investment decision. After the rm chooses an investment, a bank that monitors observes the investment decision and withdraws the loan if the unsafe project is chosen. In this case the bank invests in the risk-free bond and the rm is liquidated. If the bank does not withdraw the loan, then the rm privately observes the outcome of its investment and decides whether to pay back the loan. If the loan is paid back, the game ends. If the loan is not paid back, the rm is liquidated and both the bank and rm receive nothing. We assume liquidation is costly so that the rm repays debt whenever possible.
either assumes that rms can observe bank monitoring actions before investment decisions are made, or that banks can directly control rms' investment decisions. Both these assumptions imply that banks can commit to monitoring strategies. Our assumption is most appropriate in environments where monitoring resources are scarce and where banks have some exibility in determining how strictly they enforce the terms of the contracts they write. 
The Monitoring Investment Game
Since the rm's investment decision and the bank's monitoring decision are made after a loan is accepted at a given interest rate, we can analyze these decisions without rst considering the process through which the interest rate is set. In this section, we discuss the monitoring and investment strategies available to the bank and the rm, and show how the equilibrium strategies depend on the interest rate of the loan.
If the rm facing interest rate r chooses a safe investment technology, its future pro t is s f = s , r:
If the unsafe project is chosen, the rm's expected pro t is u f = 1 , p m u , r:
Comparing the two pro t functions, we see that for a xed monitoring probability the pro t di erence between choosing the unsafe project over the safe project increases By comparing the two bank pro t functions, it is straightforward to show that for very high interest rates the return from a repaid loan is so great that the bank never has an incentive to monitor the rm. This critical interest rate is r = r f + 1 , kr f , m :
If r r, the bank's monitoring decision depends on the expected behavior of the rm. When p s is high, the bank has relatively little incentive to monitor the loan since the probability of default p s 1 , is low. If p s is low and the bank cannot extract high returns when an unsafe project pays o , the bank has an incentive to protect itself from default through monitoring. If s r r then the loan must be recalled, because the bank nds it most pro table to monitor unsafe loans but the rm is never able to pro tably undertake a safe project. This case corresponds to an extreme form of credit rationing see Case 2 follows directly from the de nition ofr. Case 1 is a mixed strategy equilibrium that arises because the bank cannot commit to a monitoring strategy before the rm chooses which t ype of project to undertake. When r r, a high probability of monitoring tends to encourage the rm to choose a safe project. However, if the rm is very likely to choose a safe project, the bank has little incentive to monitor because doing so only increases the bank's return when the rm chooses an unsafe project.
Interest Rate Setting Games
The bank's ability to extract rents from the rm is determined by the product market competition for loan customers. When the bank is a monopoly lender the rm has no outside nancing option, so the bank sets the interest rate to maximize its pro t subject to the constraint that the rm expects to break even. In contrast, in a competitive lending environment, power over setting interest rates e ectively shifts from the bank to the rm. We model this case by assuming that the rm chooses r to maximize its pro t subject to the constraint that the bank has no incentive to exit i.e. the bank earns nonnegative economic rents.
Monopoly Lending
Let f r and b r denote respectively the rm's and bank's expected pro ts from playing the equilibrium strategies described in Lemma 1. In setting the interest rate a monopoly bank solvesr m = arg max r f ru b r: 1 Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that the rm will always receive nonnegative expected pro t once a loan is made, so the rm's participation constraint i s n o t binding.
To characterize the solution to the bank's optimization problem, it is helpful to understand the shape of b r. Figure 3 sketches the bank's expected second-stage equilibrium pro t as a function of r for a typical con guration of model parameters. In the range of mixing equilibria r r bank pro ts are a concave function of the interest rate. In this region higher interest rates give the bank larger returns in the event that an investment project is successful. However, as shown in Lemma 1, they also coincide with a lower likelihood that the safe project will be chosen. As the interest rate rises, the negative e ect of the rm's opportunistic behavior eventually outweighs the positive e ect of higher interest rates on bank revenues. Denote the maximand over the concave portion of b r b y r . If the bank's expected return from charging r is less than its opportunity cost of capital, kr f , the bank is never willing to extend a loan that involves monitoring in equilibrium. To ensure that b r 0, we add our nal parameter restriction; Assumption 4 q 1 , kr f , p m 2 m When r r the bank has no incentive to monitor the rm and the rm is able to choose the unsafe investment project with certainty. In this region, a change in r simply determines how surplus is divided between the bank and the rm. Thus, for r r, b r is strictly increasing.
Given the shape of the bank's expected pro t function we have just described, it should be clear that there exist two local maxima, one at r and one at u. The lemma below describes these maxima. Since r r and u r, Lemma 1 reveals that greater risk is shifted to the FDIC when the interest rate u is chosen than when r is chosen. Thus, we can treat the di erence M b = b u , b r as a measure of the bank's equilibrium moral hazard with respect to the FDIC. This measure depends in an intuitive way on k and m, the parameters of the model that directly enter the bank's pro t function but do not directly a ect rm pro ts. It is straightforward to show that @M b =@k 0 and @M b =@m 0. An increase in bank capital relative to insured deposits mitigates the bank moral hazard problem. Increasing m makes it more costly for the bank to protect deposits, exacerbating the bank moral hazard problem.
To aid in discussing the relationship between bank moral hazard and interest rates, the following de nition is useful.
De nition 1 When M b 0, the bank has strong moral hazard" with respect to the FDIC. Conversely, when M b 0 the bank has weak moral hazard" with respect to the FDIC.
Clearly, when the bank has strong moral hazard r m = u and when the bank has weak moral hazard r m = r . Notice that when the bank has weak moral hazard, bank pro ts are increasing in k. This counterintuitive relationship results from the strategic role of bank capital in the monitoring investment game. Recall that once a loan is made the bank cannot commit to a monitoring strategy before the rm makes its investment decision. By raising the bank's cost of default, a higher capital requirement makes monitoring credible given the rm's original investment strategy. Thus, in the new equilibrium the rm chooses the safe project with higher probability, making the bank strictly better o .
Competitive Lending
In our model of a competitive lending environment, the rm solveŝ r c = arg max r f ru f r such that b r 0: 2 Figure 4 illustrates the rm's expected stage-two pro t as a function of r. When r r, the rm is indi erent between choosing the safe and the unsafe projects, sô f r = s,r. f r decreases linearly over this region. For r r,p s = 0 and p m = 0 , so f r = u , r which also decreases linearly. Note that when r is approachingr from below,p m is increasing but drops to zero when r = r. This abrupt change in the bank's equilibrium strategy results in a discontinuous increase in the rm's expected pro t.
Depending on the parameters of the model, the unique competitive equilibrium interest rate takes on one of two values. If the moral hazard problem between the rm and the bank is small relative to the bank's incentives to protect deposits from default, then the competitive i n terest rate lies in the range of rates generating a mixing equilibrium in monitoring and investment strategies. This interest rate is the lowest rate at which the bank can make non-negative economic pro ts and is denoted r c .
If the moral hazard problem between the rm and the bank is relatively large, then the rm prefers an equilibrium involving no monitoring. The corresponding interest rate, r c , is the rate abover at which the bank earns zero economic pro ts. These conclusions are formalized in the lemma below.
Lemma 3 The rm shifts less risk to the bank, and the bank has a greater incentive to protect deposits through monitoring. Thus, M f captures the rm's incentive to choose an interest rate that shifts risk to the bank directly, and shifts risk to the FDIC indirectly. It can beshown that @M f =@u 0 and @M f =@s 0. Thus, as we should expect, the rm's moral hazard incentive is increasing in the gap between payo s from the unsafe and the safe investment projects. The following de nition will aid in the exposition that follows.
De nition 2 When M f 0, the rm has strong moral hazard" with respect to the bank. Conversely, when M f 0 the rm has weak moral hazard" with respect to the bank.
Clearly, when the rm has weak moral hazard r c = r c and when the rm has strong moral hazard r c = r c .
Equilibrium Interest Rates
Lemmas 2 and 3 and the easily veri ed inequalities r c r and r c u imply Proposition 1 below. This proposition describes the equilibrium relationship between bank and rm moral hazard, market structure, and the equilibrium interest rate.
Proposition 1 If the bank has weak moral hazard and the rm has strong moral hazard, then r m r c , otherwise r c r m .
The surprising implication of Proposition 1 is that under some circumstances the monopoly interest rate may actually be lower than the competitive i n terest rate. The explanation for this result is instructive. In a competitive lending environment, control over setting interest rates e ectively rests with the rm, whereas in a monopolistic environment control rests with the bank. Thus, under competition, the rm's incentives to take on risk determine the equilibrium interest rate, while under monopoly the bank's risk-taking incentives are more important.
A rm with strong moral hazard relative to the bank can obtain high expected pro t by investing in the unsafe project. However, if the bank monitors the rm it will recall the loan before the unsafe investment can be made. Monitoring is prevented when r so high that the bank is unwilling to forgo its expected interest payment by recalling the loan. A rm with strong moral hazard prefers such an equilibrium to a lower interest rate equilibrium in which monitoring occurs with positive probability. In a competitive lending environment the rm will only accept a loan from a bank o ering an interest rate high enough to credibly guarantee that it will not be monitored.
A bank with weak moral hazard with respect to the FDIC has a relatively strong incentive to prevent default. The bank knows that in the absence of a change in its monitoring strategy, a higher interest rate increases the rm's incentive to invest in the unsafe project. The bank prefers a relatively low interest rate at which the rm can be induced to choose the safe project with positive probability to a high interest rate at which the rm chooses the unsafe project. In a monopoly setting, the bank sets r low enough to guarantee that a l o w risk equilibria occurs.
Market Structure and Default Risk
The ex ante probability that the rm defaults on a bank loan is R = 1 , 1 , p s 1 , p m :
Because we assume that the bank makes only one loan i.e. its loan portfolio is not diversi ed, R also captures the probability that the bank fails, forcing the FDIC to repay depositors. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between r and default risk. A direct consequence of Lemma 1 is that when r r, default risk is locally decreasing in r. Even though higher interest rates exacerbate the moral hazard problem of the rm, higher interest rates do not imply greater risk to the deposit insurance fund. As r rises the bank's marginal return from monitoring rises as well. When r r, p m increases with r faster than p s declines, so risk is negatively related to r. A discontinuity in the risk function occurs atr. When r reachesr the expected return to the bank from a loan invested in a risky project is larger than the return from recalling a monitored loan. At this point, the bank stops mixing between the monitoring and no monitoring strategies, and the rm stops mixing between the safe and unsafe investment strategies. When r r neither player takes action to protect deposits.
Since the probability of default is not monotonic in the interest rate, and since market power may result in either a higher or a lower equilibrium interest rate, we cannot unambiguously conclude that one market structure poses less risk to deposit insurance than another. Rather the relative safety of competitive and monopolistic lending markets depends on the degree of bank and rm moral hazard. Proposition 2 describes the relationship between our earlier measures of moral hazard and The proof of this proposition is straightforward, and follows directly from Proposition 1 and the shape of the default risk function implied by Lemma 1 and illustrated in Figure 5 .
When bank moral hazard is weak, competition increases bank risk in one of two ways. If the rm has weak moral hazard, competition bids down interest rates. At the lower competitive interest rate, the bank has less incentive to monitor the rm because 1 the rm has less incentive to undertake the risky project, and 2 the expected loss to the bank from allowing the rm to default is lower. In equilibrium, the rm chooses the safe project with higher probability, but the bank monitors with lower probability. The latter e ect dominates and bank risk increases. Alternatively, as shown in Proposition 1, when the bank has weak moral hazard and the rm has strong moral hazard, competition results in a higher equilibrium interest rate than monopoly. In this case, the rm has such a strong incentive to invest in the unsafe project that it is willing to pay the bank an interest rate high enough to ensure that it has no incentive to monitor. In this competitive equilibrium, the rm chooses the unsafe project with certainty and the bank does not monitor.
As discussed in the introduction, an inverse relationship between market power and bank risk is also suggested by Keeley 1990 . It is important to note that Keeley's explanation for this relationship is very di erent from our own. In Keeley's model, market power increases banks' expected future pro ts from remaining in business, giving them an greater incentive to reduce current risk. In our model, market power does not change banks' incentives, rather it enhances a conservative bank's ability t o reduce risk through interest rate setting and monitoring.
When bank moral hazard is strong, a monopoly bank prefers to charge a very high interest rate even though this interest rate leads to high bank risk. In this case competition, by bidding down interest rates, may actually reduce bank risk. This result is consistent with theoretical research on universal banking by John et al. 1994 and Boyd et al. 1998. 6 This literature shows that allowing banks that have an incentive to shift risk to the FDIC to participate in the bene ts of rm risktaking through direct equity claims on rm pro ts may induce banks to increase risk. Proposition 2 shows that insofar as market power allows banks with strong moral hazard to participate in the upside bene ts of rm risk-taking by charging higher interest rates, market power also leads to greater bank risk.
The 1980s Banking Crisis Reconsidered
Volatile energy, real estate, and agriculture prices led to severe regional recessions throughout the United States during the 1980s and early 1990s. While such recessions were not new, the banking crisis associated with them had no precedent in the years following World War II. The theoretical model developed in this paper can help explain the structural causes of this crisis. Our explanation relies on two intuitive assumptions. First, regulatory oversight and capital requirements are su cient to moderate banks' incentives to shift risk to the FDIC i.e. banks have weak moral hazard. Second, rms' incentives to shift risk to banks are greatest during economic recessions i.e. rms have strong moral hazard during recessions and weak moral hazards during expansions.
Given these assumptions our model tells the following story. Prior to the 1980s banks with monopoly power were able to charge borrowers moderate interest rates and guarantee low risk equilibria during both expansions and recessions. Interest rates were high enough to provide banks with economic rents, but were low enough so that banks monitored rms to limit excessive risk-taking. By the middle 1980s, increased competition among banks and between banks and other nancial institutions such as Savings and Loans and nance companies had eroded banks' bargaining power vis-a-vis borrowers. During economic expansions, banks had to accept lower loan interest rates and lower pro ts. During recessions, rms with strong incentives to undertake risky investment projects were willing to pay high interest rates to ensure that they would not beclosely monitored by banks. Without market power, banks had no choice but to accept these high interest rate high risk equilibria. As a result, during the recessions of the 1980s, banks monitored borrowers less intensively and borrower risk-taking increased.
Since 1993 the United States has enjoyed a protracted economic expansion and bank failure rates have returned to their low pre-1980s levels. This decline in failures is consistent with our view that in a competitive lending environment bank risk is more highly correlated with the business cycle than in a monopolistic setting. Ominously, this view predicts that bank failure rates are likely to rise again during future economic downturns.
A Proof of Lemma 1 Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that when r r no weakly dominated pure strategy exists for either the rm or the bank. Therefore, there exists at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. 0. This fact along with the strict concavity of b r over the interval r f ;r implies that there exists a nonempty, compact interval r f ;r who's elements satisfy the bank's participation constraint. Therefore, r c = min , and is obtained by nding the smaller value of the two quadratic roots of r that set 3 equal to 0.
When r r, stage two equilibrium rm pro t is f r = u , r which decreases in r. Since 4 increases in r, r c is the unique value of r that sets 4 equal to 0. Assumptions 2 and 3 guarantees that this r exists.
